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enforced wherever the person is found.3 However, jurisdiction is
discretionary in such cases. Thus, where the right of recovery given
by the foreign state is so dissimilar to that given by the law of the
state in which the action is brought as to be incapable of enforcement
in such state, the action cannot be maintained. The latter proposition
was applied in Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co. 4 In that case the
district court refused to entertain jurisdiction because the foreign
statute sued on contemplated decree for periodical payments analogous to alimony, subject to modification from time to time as the
circumstances change. The main problem is to determine when the
right of action arising in the foreign state is so dissimilar to that
given by the state wherein the action is brought as to be against its
declared public policy. In the principal case, there was a mere procedural difficulty which could be overcome by staying enforcement of
judgment until plaintiff became qualified to collect it in accordance
with the New Jersey law. Since our Surrogate's Court Act 5 permits
such practice the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the facts stated in the complaint did not constitute a cause of action
was properly denied.
A.S.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RAILROAD REGULATION-APPLICATION
FOR REHEARING BECAUSE OF CHANGED ECONOMIC LEVEL SHOULD
BE GRANTED-JUDICIAL NOTICE WILL BE TAKEN OF DEPRESSION.-

Plaintiff railroad company sues to restrain enforcement of an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission made as a result of a general
investigation of rates, charges, regulations and practices as authorized
by the Hoch-Smith resolution. The record of the hearing before the
Commission was closed in September, 1928. An order of the Commission was reported on July 1, 1930. In February, 1931, before the
order was made effective, the plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing,
which was denied. This suit is brought to restrain the enforcement
of the order on the ground that the denial of the petition for rehearing was an abuse of administrative discretion and, consequently, a
denial of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, injunction should be granted. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company v. United States, 284 U. S. 248, 52 Sup.
Ct. 146 (1932).
'State

of Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921);

Zeikus v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 153 App. Div. 345, 138 N. Y. Supp. 478
(2d Dept. 1912).
' Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581 (1904).
'N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT §§89, 122.

RECENT DECISIONS
The Commission has broad powers and a wide extent of administrative discretion but it is fundamental that the powers of the Commission are subject to circumscription by legislative enactments and
constitutional rights. It is a fundamental requirement that opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided by the Commission in the
discharge of its duties.' Lacking this, an order of the Commission
will be in violation of the due process clause.2 Moreover, an edict of
the Commission may be set aside as arbitrary and unreasonable in3
the light of the general intendment of the legislative requirements.
Assuredly, in view of the present economic conditions existing in the
country and in view of the financial situation of the railroads, the
order of the Commission, based on facts existent in 1928, requiring
the lowering of rates is unreasonable and arbitrary. No opportunity
for a fair hearing on the basis of a record reflecting the present conditions has been given. The difference between conditions in 1931
and in 1928 is not a matter of a slight fluctuation in business conditions but is the result of the advent of a new economic level. The
allegation that the general business level has drastically declined needs
no proof. The change is the outstanding contemporary fact, dominating thought and action throughout the country. Since it is a fact
of common everyday knowledge which admittedly everyone within
this country can be presumed to know, the court will take judicial
notice of the present economic situation; it would not be good sense to
do otherwise.4 Stripped of its technical grounding in the rules of
administrative and constitutional law, the decision is one which has
for its motivating power a degree of common sense which seems to
be an attribute peculiar to the members of the United States Supreme
Court.
E. P. W.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-REQUIREMENT OF FINDING OF PUBLIC
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FACILITIES AS PREREQUISITE TO LICENSE TO
ENGAGE IN ICE BUSINEs.-Plaintiff, engaged in the manufacture,

sale, and distribution of ice in Oklahoma City under a license of the
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, brought a bill in the United
States District Court to enjoin defendant from engaging in the same
I Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186 (1913).

v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369, 50 Sup. Ct. 299, 302 (1930).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 215 U. S.
452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155 (1910) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108 (1912).
"McKELVEY, EVIDENCE (1924) §12. "The doctrine of judicial notice is
that there are certain facts of which the courts will not require evidence,
because they are so well known, so easily ascertainable or so related to the
official character of the court, that it would not be good sense to do so."
2 Dohany

